Abstracts of Recent English Decisions by Editors,
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
of business or residence. It is clear that
the condition is not that the demand
shall be made of the maker personally,
nor at any mere locality, but at that
place where the additional fact appears,
that it is the maker's place of business
or his residence. Chitty on Bills, 412;
Byles on Bills, 157. It has been held
that a personal demand upon the ac-
ceptor of a bill at some other place is
not sufficient. King vs. Holmes, 11
Penna. St. 465. The element of resi-
dence is so important, that if the maker
of a note payable 'generally happen
to be out of the country of his resi-
dence when the note is made, and return
before it is due, the demand must still
be made at his residence. Spies vs.
Gilmore, 1 Coins. 321. So if the maker
removes after the note is made to an-
other place within the State, demand
must be made at the new residence.
Demand at the residence is then the sub-
stantial part of the condition. If the
maker removes from his residence to
another State or country between the
time of making the note and the day it
falls due, he prevents the holder from
fulfilling the condition. There is no
necessity to present the note at the former
residence. This would be substituting a
different condition; that of locality in-
stead of residence. It is well settled that
the holder need not follow the maker out
of the State to his new residence.
The result is, that the condition is en-
tirely waived.
T. W. D.
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HOUSE OF LORDS.
Joint-Stock Company- Transfer of Shares-Forqed Transfer-Lia-
bliyt of Company to re-transfer-Suit in Equity-Action at Law.-
T. and B. were in partnership, and took shares in the Midland Railway
Company, as partnership property. B. forged T.'s name to a deed of
transfer of the shares, purporting to be from T. and B. to L. for a nominal
consideration. The company acted on this deed, and entered the name of
L. as proprietor, and paid the dividends to B. for L., but B. appropriated
the same, T. having died before B. Held, the administrator of T. had a
right of suit in equity against the company, to replace the stock, and pay
over the dividends which had been fraudulently obtained by B.; and it
made no difference that there was no person capable of bringing an action
at law: .Midland Railway Company vs. Taylor.i
Legacy-Yesting-Gift to a Class and Survivors -- Meaning of word
"Vest" -General Rules of Construction.-Whdre a testator gives a life-
estate in his funds, and at the expiration thereof gives the principal to be
16 L. T., N. S. 73.
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divided among several, and if any die then to the survivors, without speci-
fying the time of survivorship, he is held to mean the contingency to
extend over the whole period which elapses before the time of distribution
or expiration of the life-estate, unless the context points out another time;
in other words, the legacy does not vest till the death of the tenant for
life: Richardson vs. Robertson.1
Therefore where A., by will, gave a life-estate to B., and at B.'s death
to six persons equally, declaring that "if any die without issue before
his share vests, the same shall belong equally to the survivors," there
was nothing in the word "vest" to prevent the application of the above
rule: Id.
The word "vest" means prima facie, "1 come into possession," and not
"accrue in point of interest :" Id.
Joint-Stock Coonany-Fraud-fisreresentatons by Secretary and
Directors-Row far Binding on Company.-A court- of equity will not
relieve on a general charge of fraud, but it must be alleged in what the
fraud consists, and how it has been effected: New Brunswick, &c., Rail-
wvay Company vs. Conybeare.
If reports are made to the shareholders of a joint-stock company by
the directors, and adopted at one of the meetings of the company, and
afterwards industriously circulated, the representations in those reports
become, after this adoption, those of the company, and therefore binding
on the company. And if those reports so circulated, can be shown to be
proximate and immediate cause of the shares being bought by individuals,
the company cannot retain the benefit of the contract and keep the pur-
chase-money which has been paid: ITd.
If an incorporated company, acting by its agent, induces a person to
enter into a contract for the benefit of the company, that company can no
more repudiate the fraudulent agent than an individual could repudiate
him, and the company are bound by the misrepresentations of their agent.
But the principle cannot be carried so far that an action can be brought
against the company on the ground of deceit, because the directors have
done an act which might render them liable to such an action (per Lord
Cranworth) : Id.
2 6 L. T., N. S. 109.16U L. T., N. S. 75.
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COURT OF APPEAL, CHANCERY.
Injunction-Mining Lease-Demise of License to make Roads, &c.-
Covenant to yield up Roads, &-c.-Execution-Creditor of Lessee-His
Right to seize Iron Plates and Sleepers.-T a lease of mines the plaintiff
demised to K. full and free liberty aud license to make and use such roads
and ways upon the premises as should be "necessary or expedient for car-
rying and conveying" the minerals, and for "the commodious carrying on
of the business of an iron-master." There was then a covenant by the
lessee, at the determination of the lease, to yield up such roads and ways
in such good repair, &c., as that the works might be carried on by the
lessor, his heirs and assigns.
Upon the works were two tram-roads, the plates of which were attached
to iron and stone sleepers, fixed in the roadway. These tram-roads existed
at the date of the lease, but they had since been much enlarged, and new
tramplates had been, to a great extent, substituted. Upon a bill filed by
the lessor to restrain an execution-creditor of the.lessee from taking up
and removing the iron railroads and tramplates, field, that such movable
chattels, as are referred to, were not included in the terms "works," or
"ways," or "roads," and the injunction granted by Stuart, V. C., against
the creditor, was dissolved: Ditke of Beaufort vs. Bates.]
LORD CHANCELLOR.
Patent- Vaidity of Specification-Publication.-Although the con-
struction of a specification belongs to the court, the explanation of technical
terms of art, commercial phrases, and the proofs and results of the pro-
cesses which are described in it, are matters of fact, upon which evidence
may be given, contradictory testimony adduced, and therefore upon which
it is the province of the jury to decide; but when those portions of a
specification are made the subject of evidence and brought within the pro-
vince of the jury, the direction to be given to the jury with regard to the
construction of the rest of the specification, which is conceived in ordinary
language, must be a direction given only conditionally; that is, a direction
as to the meaning of the patent upon the hypothesis or basis of the jury
arriving at a certain conclusion with regard to the meaning of the terms
used, the signification of the phrases and the truth of the processes de-
scribed in the specification : Bills vs. Evans.
2
16 L T., N. S. 82. 2 6 L. T., N. S. 90.
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Where there are two specifications of a patent to be compared, in order
to arrive at a conclusion of fact, the right of drawing the inference of
fact from the comparison belongs to the jury, and is a question of fact, and
not a question of law. If something remains to be ascertained which is
necessary for the useful application of the discovery, that affords sufficient
room for another valid patent: Id.
To support an allegation of prior knowledge of an invention so as to
avoid a patent, it must be knowledge equal to that required to be given by
a patent, namely: such knowledge as will enable the public to perceive
the very discovery, and to carry the invention into practical use : Id.
ill- Construction-Tsue-Children.-A will made in 1794 contained
the following gift over: "But if my said daughter, Grace, happen to die
without issue, then and in such case, at the decease of my said daughter,
I give and bequeath the said sum to my two daughters, S. and E., equally
to be divided between them, share and share alike, if then living" (that
is, living at the death of the testator's daughter, Grace); "but if either
of my said daughters, S. and E., should be then dead, then I give and
bequeath the share of my daughter so dying to her issue, equally to be
divided among them, if more than one." .ield, that the word "issue" did
not confine the gift to the children of the testator's daughters, but that the
remoter issue were also entitled: Weldon vs. Ho~yland.1
ROLLS COURT.
2
landlord and Tenant-Agreement for a Lease-New rHouse-Implied
Contract- Complete State of Tenantable Repair.-The defendant having
agreed with the plaintiff to take and execute a lease of a new house, with
certain covenants to repair, &c., entered into possession of the house. Soon
after serious defects appeared in the structure of it-the ceilings falling,
and settlements taking place; besides which, the water .and other pipes
were not properly fitted or finished. The defendant quitted the house,
having refused to execute the lease when tendered to him for that purpose,
on the ground generally that the house was not in a complete tenantable
condition when her entered it, and the expense he must incur if he executed
the lease with the proposed covenants in it. The plaintiff accordingly
filed the bill in this suit to enforce specific performance of the agreement
J L .
16 L. T., N. S. 90. 2 6 L. T., N. S. 98.
